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I. INTRODUCTION 
“. . . law schools may have to redefine qualification and 
merit in ways that are less racially harmful.” 1 
n Does Testing = Race Discrimination?: Ricci, the Bar Exam, the 
LSAT, and the Challenge to Learning,2 I charged a number of law 
academics with treating race as “the axis on which the world should 
turn.”3 I reached this conclusion through analysis of widespread 
criticism over the last twenty years directed against tests such as the 
bar exam and LSAT. Testing, critics have claimed, is not only an 
invalid predictor of performance; it also creates unacceptable racial 
disparities in crucial areas of social and economic life. Accordingly, 
they urge, testing systems must be subverted. The latest such sally, 
“Testing, Diversity, and Merit,” is included in this volume—and is 
primarily directed at me.4 Having carefully listened to my detractors, I 
proceed to affirm my original judgment. 
The authors, Professors Andrea Curcio, Carol Chomsky, and 
Eileen Kaufman (CCK, if I may), categorically deny holding that “race 
comes first,”5 or its twin, “diversity above all.”6 These prominent 
members of the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) charge me 
in turn with perpetuating both “a false dichotomy between the twin 
goals of diversity and identifying qualified individuals,”7 and a system 
where test scores correlate with family money and education.8 
                                                            
1 Kristen Holmquist, Marjorie Schultz, Shelden Zedeck & David Oppenheimer, 
Measuring Merit: The Schultz-Zedeck Research on Law School Admissions, 63 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 565, 575 (2014). The sentence begins: “To maintain an 
equitable admissions system and to contribute to a racially diverse legal 
profession . . . .” Id. 
2 Dan Subotnik, Does Testing = Race Discrimination?: Ricci, the Bar Exam, the 
LSAT, and the Challenge to Learning, 8 U. MASS L. REV 332 (2013). 
3 Id. at 339. 
4 Andrea Curcio, Carol Chomsky, and Eileen Kaufman, Testing, Diversity, and 
Merit: A Response to Professor Subotnik (and others), 9 UMASS L. REV. 206 
(2014). 
5 Id. at 275; see id. at 208–09. 
6 Id. at 213. 
7 Id. at 209. The authors insist that they speak for themselves in their article, not 
for SALT. Id. at 206. 
8 Id. at 210. 
I 
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Insisting that they are not “anti-intellectual,”9 CCK allow that 
universities and employers have the right to interrogate a student’s and 
an employee’s ability to succeed through tests: “Achieving fair and 
economically appropriate decision-making—not achieving racial 
balance—is the goal, but racial balance in outcomes is reason enough 
to explore the validity of the tests.”10 Citing Title VII, they go on to 
explain that educational and commercial institutions are duty-bound to 
ensure both that tests are valid, i.e. predictive, and that they do not 
produce “unintentional” and unnecessary disparities.11 
In this reply, I argue that CCK are deluding themselves—that, their 
protests to the contrary, race for them is not secondary; it comes first. I 
further argue that testing measures some-to-much of what it is 
designed to measure, and that a modern technological society requires 
these measurements. Tests are fair in the sense that they are objective 
and are usually created by groups of highly trained people.12 These 
groups of course have their own interests to protect, but the burden, I 
will argue, should be on those who would discredit test utility, a 
burden which, I hold, CCK have not met. 
II. A RETURN TO RICCI 
I begin with Ricci v. DeStefano, as do CCK.13 In short, Ricci 
involved a test given for promotion in the New Haven Fire 
Department. No African American candidate emerged among the top 
ten scorers and thus, under prevailing rules, none was eligible for 
promotion. At this point, New Haven threw out the test. According to 
CCK, New Haven’s motive for annulling test results was, as 
suggested, concern about validity—not to favor minority candidates.14 
This would seem to suggest that test validity and absence of group 
favoritism are distinct goals. 
What is beyond dispute, however, is that New Haven would not 
have annulled the test if the results had been racially balanced. Indeed, 
                                                            
9 Id. at 221–22. 
10 Id. at 211 (emphasis added). It is not clear what CCK mean by “economically 
appropriate.” 
11 Id. at 216. 
12 See, e.g., Stephen G. Sireci, The Most Frequently Unasked Questions About 
Testing, in DEFENDING STANDARDIZED TESTING 111, 111–12 (Richard P. Phelps 
ed. 2005). 
13 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
14 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 219. 
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in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court forced the City to 
promote the successful firefighters under Title VII on the grounds that 
the City had made its decision to annul the test “because of race.”15 In 
arguing that New Haven should start its assessment over because of 
attendant racial disparities in scores, are CCK holding race above all? 
CCK say no, supporting the position of the Ricci minority.16 For 
them a review of the test results was most likely mandated under Title 
VII by the resulting racial disparities; these results alerted New Haven 
that there might well be a problem with offending disparities.17 Such a 
notion, however, hardly refutes the charge that for CCK race comes 
first. If statistical disparity based on race is suggestive of invalidity, 
and if, as previously suggested, New Haven would not have offered 
another test but for the disparity, then racial balance would seem 
highly probative of validity. 
To this argument, CCK respond that invalidity can be established 
without reference to race. They argue, citing the Ricci dissent, that 
“command presence” is key for fire supervisors.18 Other jurisdictions, 
CCK claim, accordingly gave lower weight to tests and higher value to 
job assessments featuring simulations of real job conditions. But here 
again race rears its head. For CCK, evidence that these assessment 
measures were no less valid lies largely in the fact that in such 
jurisdictions a greater number of racial minorities succeeded in their 
efforts at promotion.19 Validity again means minority candidate 
success. 
To show that they were not merely reproducing a tautology, i.e., 
that they were not ignoring test validity in the normal sense of the 
word, CCK advert to the fact that the tests in these other jurisdictions 
had been vetted by testing professionals.20 But this is hardly 
convincing. The test given by New Haven had also been approved by 
professional industrial organization experts. These folks, moreover, 
went out of their way to create a test that took into account “minority 
firefighter styles.”21 
                                                            
15 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580. 
16 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 215. 
17 See id. at 215–16. 
18 Id. at 218. 
19 Id. at 219. 
20 Id. at 219–20. 
21 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 565 (2009). 
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This brings us to the practical consequences to municipalities if the 
law had required New Haven to repudiate the test. Using a simple 
cost-benefit analysis, municipalities would be obliged to scrutinize 
personnel tests to make sure that racial disparities did not lead to the 
attendant expense, embarrassment, and political cost of retesting. 
Since that is far from easy, reasonable prudence would further induce 
municipalities to develop tests and scoring systems in the first place 
that would assure minority success. In short, if CCK have their way, 
racial balance would be promoted at the expense of validity. Race 
above all? 
Affirmative action supporters may well see nothing wrong with 
this. In one sense, they are right; what kind of person would fail to 
celebrate the closing of employment and other racial gaps? But, it will 
be recalled at this point, racial balance, or “diversity above all,” is just 
what CCK repudiate as their goal.22 
III. TESTING AND RACE 
Ricci was of interest to me not because I thought one screening 
device was better or fairer than another, but because New Haven 
attempted to pull the rug out from under the white firefighters, who 
had no notice of the racial component in the test for promotion. I 
mostly used Ricci, as do CCK, as a lever to raise issues relating to 
more broad-based tests such as the bar examination, the LSAT, and 
testing in math and science. Before turning to these matters, a few 
general observations. First, I do not argue here that testing as we know 
it should be the touchstone for admissions and hiring. Tests will 
always exclude some who might well make the grade in school or on 
the job, often because they bring with them aspirations or traits that are 
not tested. On the other hand, for those working at non-menial jobs, 
job knowledge is essential. This being the case, high test scores can be 
valuable. 
Understandably, those who do not succeed on tests will attempt to 
undermine them with all the tools at their disposal. Because tests can 
always be adjusted, disparities for the test disadvantaged will be 
avoidable. But the inevitable resistance to tests does not mean that they 
should be abandoned. We cannot do without them in contemporary 
life; indeed, we need to capture the hard-to-identify-and-evaluate-
                                                            
22 See supra notes 5, 6, and accompanying text. 
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talents of our students.23 For all talk to the contrary, however, these 
exist only in experimental states and have not been developed in the 
area of greatest concern to this paper: lawyering. 
Second, as I have noted throughout my years in the legal academy, 
race is so central to the sense of self in America—race elicits so much 
insecurity and guilt—that loose talk pervades the legal discourse. As a 
result, more than the normal amount of scholarly skepticism is 
required in this area. Consider CCK’s charge about the tie between test 
performance and family wealth and education.24 Granting this 
unfortunate connection, as we must, should those without economic 
advantages not be asked to compete head-on with their more fortunate 
brethren? CCK never answer this question, much less consider the 
implications. 
Consider also what is left unaddressed by CCK in the following 
passage about test results: “[Q]uestioning [disparities] is entirely 
appropriate, especially if it results in better tests as well as more 
diverse—and more fair—outcomes.”25 The passage raises obvious 
questions; Fair to whom? The public? Firefighters generally? Minority 
firefighters? Again, CCK do not say. 
The point is, to put the matter candidly, that “more diverse” and 
“more fair” outcomes, in the results-oriented sense that CCK use the 
latter term, will often point in a different direction than “better tests.” 
This is both because groups are not per se less diverse—i.e., more 
identical—than are individuals and because testing cannot serve two 
masters equally. Diversity and excellence may not be mutually 
exclusive; but they are not synonymous either. CCK would have 
considerably strengthened their article if they had dealt explicitly with 
this inescapable and important matter. 
A. The Bar Exam 
Turning to the bar exam, CCK sound a message with a familiar 
ringtone: the famous gateway exam to the profession fails to “address 
whether there are viable, and better, ways to test for lawyering 
skills . . . without a disparate racial impact.” 26 The bar exam is 
premised on the simple idea that not everyone can be lawyer; those 
                                                            
23 See John D. Mayer, We Need More Tests, Not Fewer, N.Y. TIMES (March 11, 
2014), at A21. 
24 See supra note 8, and accompanying text. 
25 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 211. 
26 Id. at 224. CCK cite a bar committee study which complained of serious racial 
disparities. Id. at 228. 
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would seek to represent others first need to show minimum 
competency to practice law on their own.27 Only the most hardened 
public choice theorist, it would seem, believes otherwise.28 
To support their challenge to the bar exam, CCK refer to series of 
studies by the New York bar beginning in 1992 to evaluate the bar 
exam for its validity and for the racial disparities it was producing. 
These efforts resulted in reports that complained variously of the 
exam’s emphasis on “speededness,” multiple choice questions, 
memorization, multiple test subjects, and the exam’s correlative lack 
of concern with lawyerly skills.29 I discuss each of these points 
separately. As a preliminary matter, suffice to say that the bar 
examiners have been at it a long time and get lots of help from the bar. 
They are also a diverse group, racially and otherwise.30 
Regarding exam time-sensitivity, CCK charge me with suggesting, 
“without any empirical basis, that test taking speed is related to lawyer 
efficiency.”31 I do not know how to prove the point to CCK’s 
satisfaction. I took the matter mostly as self-evident, since lawyers are 
asked to read fast and well on the job. It might be helpful to recall the 
old saw that a “lawyer’s time and advice are his stock in trade.”32 The 
                                                            
27 See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, http://www.pabarexam
.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). The purpose of the bar exam is to ensure that 
exam takers have the “minimum competency necessary to become members of 
the bar.” Id. 
28 Public choice economics is premised on the idea that all too often government 
engages in conspiracies with vested interests to help the latter receive “rents,” 
i.e., undeserved windfalls. See generally PATRICK A. MCNUTT, THE ECONOMICS 
OF PUBLIC CHOICE 223–27 (2nd ed. 1996). 
29 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 230–40. 
30 See MBE FAQ, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex
.org/about-ncbe-exams/mbe/mbe-faq/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). 
The National Conference of Bar Examiners is committed to gender 
and ethnic diversity on all its drafting and policy committees. Each 
drafting committee is composed of members of both sexes, and 
members of ethnic minority groups participate in the preparation 
and review of items both at the drafting committee level and at the 
MBE policy committee level. 
 Id. 
31 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 238. 
32 Shapiro, THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (Yale University Press, 2006). 
This quote is apocryphally attributed to Abraham Lincoln. See, e.g., George B. 
Shepard & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 149 n. 224. 
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lawyer’s time must thus be used well, a matter that bar examiners 
surely understand. This is not to say that bar tests of “speededness” 
have it right. Experiments in this area might prove useful. On the other 
hand, estimates reported by CCK that an exam that doubled the 
allotted time would increase bar exam scores by thirty points33 are not 
necessarily relevant, especially if such a change inspired related 
increases in scores of all bar takers. Competitiveness in efficiency 
would seem to be relevant to employers. 
Multiple choice questions obviously cannot not be defended as 
representative of the work lawyers do. On the other hand, as CCK 
themselves point out, a report commissioned by the NY Court of 
Appeals and charged with considering race and gender performance 
concluded that the bar exam, with its multiple choice questions, did 
validly test generalized legal knowledge as it set out to do.34 In doing 
so, it would seem to serve a valuable function. Perhaps more 
important, no evidence supports the conclusion that scores on multiple 
choice questions measurably differ from those on essay writing. 
Lawyers have to be able to write. Under these circumstances, a race-
based objection to multiple choice questions cannot be sustained. 
As for the “memorization” matter, the thought presumably is that 
in the computer age the law can always be looked up. But requiring 
immediate control of some subject matter, to know some things 
“cold,” cannot be dismissed as excessive. To illustrate—and at the risk 
of sounding lame— contracts lawyers must incorporate the doctrine of 
consideration in their bones or they might not know what to look for in 
a contract formation matter. CCK might well characterize this not as 
memorization but only understanding. The label hardly matters. In my 
primary teaching domain, tax, one has to know what an expense is. A 
lawyer who has to look that up is useless. 
The claim that lawyers do not need, and proceed to forget, material 
outside their area of specialization implies that the bar exam tests too 
many subjects. But if the exam focused on one or two subjects, on 
what basis would candidates be able to apply for jobs in different 
fields of law? Moreover, analytical skills and practical solutions 
learned in one specialized area are often transferrable to another. Legal 
problems do not come in topically discrete containers. Finally, it is 
hard to imagine that testing in one area would produce a distribution 
                                                            
33 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 238–39. 
34 See id. at 227. 
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that was any different from the current one encompassing many areas. 
If CCK think otherwise, they should say so. 
But there is something more fundamental here. Passing the bar 
proves that you can learn and digest a mass of information. It may well 
not matter whether that material is ever used, whether it sits on the 
back burner of the mind, or whether it is soon forgotten. Whether or 
not you have to know something to begin a practice, controlling a 
large swath of disparate material would seem to be essential to success 
in the practice of law as in any other profession. 
I will address proposed alternatives to the bar exam below. For 
now, a return to a simple question: Do CCK really want a screening 
device for the bar? 35 Or is it again racial balance that they seek? 
I commented in my earlier piece about the irony served up when 
academics in a “learned profession” bash tests of knowledge.36 In a 
“knowledge economy” and an “information age,” no less. But there is 
no paradox here for CCK. Academic knowledge is one thing; work 
knowledge another. 
But here again, there is reason to doubt CCK’s understanding of 
their own motives. Indeed, CCK readily acknowledge that African 
Americans do not do well on the bar, referring to a “quite large” racial 
gap in New York several years ago. Based on a passing score of 660 a 
few years back, the pass rate in New York for Caucasian/whites was 
88% while for Black/African Americans it was 58%.37 
It simply cannot be the construction of the bar exam that is at fault 
for failing to show what students can do. On all kinds of evaluations, 
starting in the earliest years of childhood and continuing through 
adulthood, CCK admit, African Americans lag behind their 
counterparts.38 Gaps may be greatest of all in law schools.39 CCK 
identify possible causes of these gaps, but they are no more able to 
evaluate them than to explain why bar exam tests do not measure 
knowledge necessary for lawyers. 
One thing, however, is apparent. Lack of competitiveness is a 
tragedy in contemporary America. For all the research, for all the 
effort and money this country has invested, we have not learned how 
to properly educate our black youth. The point here is that it would be 
                                                            
35 See id. at 249. 
36 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 395. 
37 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 225 n. 84. 
38 Id. at 271. 
39 Id. at 263. 
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miraculous at this time if our black young people as a group were 
competitive on tests of knowledge that bar examiners would choose to 
give. This being the case, if they are to hold black and white students 
as equally prepared for law school, CCK must try to define bar exam 
validity in terms other than that of knowledge. Hence the opening 
epigraph. 
Assisting in this effort is the attack on law school grades.40 CCK 
must play down grades because they correlate with bar passage.41 In 
this attack, CCK are least convincing. The evidence they present is 
essentially limited to a study of a large New York law firm that found 
that law school grades did not tie to success at the firm except for 
those at the very top of their classes.42 But if, as is likely, the firm 
could restrict hires to those from the top of the class through high 
salaries, a restriction of range problem would render this study 
meaningless. 
If grades are not important, what is? It is not just that tests of 
knowledge are invalid. It is that knowledge itself is overrated. Success 
at work is founded on “[C]reativity, the ability to work well in teams, 
listening skills, common sense, and good judgment.”43 CCK are 
undoubtedly right in the high value they attach to these factors and I 
will come back to this arguement. But if CCK really believed that 
grades do not matter, we could expect them to address the issue of 
grades on a broader scale. Concern about grades after all drives many 
students to distraction and requires administrators to provide costly 
mental health services.44 
More important, If students are actually deficient in emotional and 
interpersonal competence, or if studying Title VII, antitrust, and 
privacy law provides an insufficient professional payoff for them, law 
schools should be hiring educational psychologists and expanding the 
curriculum. Warehouses full self-help books and DVDs could be 
mined to enhance student creativity and relationships with co-workers, 
superiors, subordinates, and especially clients. 
                                                            
40 Id. at 239. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 240. 
44 We should all agree that law school would be sweeter and healthier if students 
were told explicitly that grades are just a vestige of a corrupt hierarchical system 
and that they should be taking take their nights off. 
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One should not suppose that training in these areas would be 
déclassé for even a top graduate school. The University of Chicago 
Graduate School of Business, for example, requires all students to take 
Leadership Effectiveness and Development, a course that highlights 
negotiation, team building, and giving feedback.45 
Consistent with their stated goal of testing merit, CCK do not 
suggest that law graduates be automatically licensed to practice law, a 
state of affairs that exists in Wisconsin for those who do their legal 
study in the State and remain there to work.46 They propose as 
alternatives to current bar exams a range of programs that test 
“MacCrate” skills rather than doctrine, pointing as a model to the 
Daniel Webster Scholars Honors Program at the University of New 
Hampshire School of Law.47 Upon completion of one year at UNH, 
those accepted into the program move to special educational 
environments in which MacCrate skills are highlighted and students 
are monitored by faculty and members of the New Hampshire Board 
of Law Examiners. Upon successful completion of the program, 
students can be admitted into the New Hampshire bar without having 
to take the bar exam. 
There is much to be said for teaching legal skills and then testing 
for them. How much, however, can such testing in these conditions 
accomplish? UNH Law School only accepts only one-third of its 
approximately seventy-five students per class into the program, and 
these students follow a prescribed curriculum and must maintain a B 
average to graduate.48 Admittees, in other words, have either already 
shown or could be expected to develop the requisite knowledge; they 
would most likely pass the regular bar exam. Thus the Program would 
not satisfy CCK’s objectives of producing lawyers who would 
otherwise be screened out. Beyond that problem, it is hard to see how 
                                                            
45 See Leadership, Effectiveness, and Development (LEAD), THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO BOOTH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, http://www.chicagobooth.edu/programs
/full-time/academics/lead (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). The University of Chicago 
Business School has entire concentrations of relevance to us here, e.g., 
marketing management, general management, and managerial and 
organizational behavior. Id. 
46 See WIS. STAT. § 757.28 (2012). 
47 Id. at 245–46. 
48 Telephone Interview with Professor John B. Garvey, Director of the Daniel 
Webster Scholar Honor’s Program, University of New Hampshire School of 
Law (Apr. 22, 2014). 
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this could play out in New York State when 15,000 candidates seek 
admission to the bar at the same time. 
An alternative plan proposed by CCK would be to give students 
credit for public service or clinic experience, and there is something to 
be said for this as well.49 But here too, in addition to the impossibility 
of objective measurement and all the issues of fairness that that would 
raise, there is the problem of candidate doctrinal knowledge. For 
reasons previously mentioned, that cannot simply be wished away. 
B. The LSAT 
Just as CCK deem legal knowledge as measured by bar exam 
scores largely irrelevant for assessing readiness for professional 
practice, so too do they hold cognitive testing on the LSAT to be 
irrelevant for measuring capacity to function as a lawyer. The LSAT, 
CCK admit, is useful in predicting first-year grades in doctrinal 
courses because it tests the same “narrow range of analytical skills 
using multiple choice and essay or short answer questions 
administered under time pressure.”50 But it fails to “fully predict 
academic performance”51 and it does not test “practical judgment” and 
“communication,”52 required for the job. Aggravating the problem 
with the LSAT is the malevolent influence of US News & World 
Report.53 
Since a measure that can “fully predict” anything in our world 
would seem hard to come by, rejecting the LSAT on this basis makes 
little sense. Law schools can try to screen for students with “practical 
judgment,” but how to find this elusive quality? As for communication 
skills, the LSAT already requires candidates to write a coherent and 
persuasive essay.54 
This suggests that the real concern raised by the LSAT lies 
elsewhere. If measurement is important for educational institutions, if 
the LSAT is designed to help students avoid enormous expense and 
                                                            
49 See Curcio, supra note 4, at pp. 249–52. 
50 Id. at 254. 
51 See id. The test reportedly does not correlate with grades in legal research and 
writing. 
52 See id. at 264. 
53 Id. at 258–59. 
54 The bar exam already requires an essay. See, e.g., Bar Admissions Basic 
Overview, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/bar_admissions/basic_overv
iew.html. 
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frustration when their chances of success are limited, it would seem 
that it is the racial disparities again that are at issue. The sad reality is 
that the mean African American LSAT score of 143 is ten points lower 
than the average white score, 153.55 
That law schools overvalue the LSAT will find no support here. 
But in order to seriously limit use of that test, it would seem, critics 
must show one of two things: either that law school grades do not 
measure anything useful, or that there are good alternatives or 
supplements to the LSAT. 
As for grades, we need more evidence from CCK than they 
provide. If first-year grades have no significance, one would expect 
that, as was discussed in relation to the bar exam, CCK would be 
urging law schools to move to pass-fail systems or perhaps to abolish 
final exams. That CCK do not go this far should lead readers to be 
skeptical. The other problem with CCK’s critique is the absence of real 
alternatives to the LSAT. Without these, we cannot know what 
significance to give to racial disparities.56 
To be sure, discussing aptitude testing, CCK tell us about 
efforts to measure the “multiple aspects of intelligence,” citing the 
work among others of Robert Steinberg whose test reportedly has 
“twice the practical predictive power” of the SAT alone on scholastic 
performance.57 But they do not tell us whether this test is appropriate 
for law schools. 
CCK report more fully on the work of Marjorie Shultz and 
Sheldon Zedeck.58 After years of research with scores of practitioners, 
these two researchers found 26 “effectiveness” factors59 and developed 
tests for their measurement. The good news, CCK report, is that there 
are few racial subgroup differences. But CCK do not show us Shultz 
and Zedeck’s tests, or samples thereof. CCK admit, moreover, that this 
work, along with Steinberg’s, is “developing, not definitive.”60 Under 
                                                            
55 See Law School Admissions Council, LSAT Technical Report 12-03, at 19 (Oct. 
2012). 
56 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 260–62. 
57 See id at 260. 
58 See Marjore M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: 
Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 620 (2011). 
59 Id. at 630. 
60 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 262–63. Holmquist et al. suggest that, although 
requiring much more validation work, the test is available now. See Holmquist, 
Schultz, Zedeck & Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 382. 
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the circumstances, it is hard to know what rational observers are 
supposed to do except to continue with the current system. 
C. The Workplace 
In the last section of their article, CCK extend their case against 
the bar exam to the workplace. This environment they argue requires 
employees to “recognize problems that are ill defined, require 
information-seeking, may have multiple acceptable solutions, may 
require information learned in everyday experience, and potentially 
require motivation and personal involvement, a different set of skills 
than those involved in solving academic problems.”61 
The implication is that learning in school is a dead end, i.e., its 
utility ends at the threshold of the workplace. Easy to say; but is it so? 
My point: academic training makes it more likely, not less likely, that 
well-educated students will come up with “multiple acceptable 
solutions.” Learning, moreover, requires motivation and curiosity 
about the world. To the extent that CCK distance the relationship 
between school and the job, they themselves are creating a false 
dichotomy.62 
Work, for CCK, correlates not so much with cognitive skills but 
with “conscientiousness, extraversion, emotional stability, agree-
ableness, and openness to experience.”63 These factors are important, 
to be sure. Doing well in school, however, evidences 
conscientiousness. A curriculum vitae will show personal involvement 
in the form of organizational leadership both in school and outside of 
it. It will also demonstrate a thirst for experience. But surely it cannot 
be assumed from the absence of good grades that students are doing 
something interesting and productive; students have to show it. Even 
where a student can show a successful internship at a not-for-profit 
during law school, CCK provide no help in assessing how that should 
play out in law firm hiring. 
We come to what seems the most important ingredient for success 
at work for CCK—at least they tout it more highly than any other 
element, including knowledge: race itself, i.e., diversity. Hiring racial 
minorities, say CCK, will help companies serve an “increasingly 
diverse customer base.”64 Indeed, “[t]he market arguments in favor of 
                                                            
61 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 262–63. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 270–71. 
64 Id at 268 (citing Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of 
Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 424–27 (2008)). 
2014 Race Indeed Above All 293 
diversity are compelling.”65 Diversity is perhaps most important in the 
legal profession and judiciary. A diverse workplace brings different 
“life experiences,” “linguistic and cultural skills, knowledge of 
international markets,” and it “strengthens the rule of law.”66 The trick 
is to liberate ourselves from the oppressive burden of tests so as to 
give appropriate effect to diversity. Whatever the diversity payoff to 
individual employers or to the larger society, we are back to the 
bottom-line question: race above all? 
One matter remains. Admittedly, much of the previous discussion, 
on both sides, has been based on conjecture. Which kind of screening 
test is more valid for promotion in the fire department? Do lawyers 
with high LSAT and bar exam scores perform better than others? 
Could those who do not pass the bar exam perform sufficiently well. 
In sum, are tests just crapshoots? 
While CCK provide no empirical evidence of the economic 
contribution of diversity, I did provide such evidence on the value of 
cognitive skills and knowledge that current tests measure. I cited a 
study by a major economic player in the world, the Organization of 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), of the results on 
science and math tests (PISA scores) administered to 15 year-olds in 
mostly developed countries around the world. American students 
emerged in the middle of the pack. Most important, researchers found 
that math and science scores, which were also tied to reading scores, 
correlated with GDP growth rates. The study ended up estimating that 
if the US had been at the top in test scores, the present value of the 
economic growth would be over $100 trillion. 
CCK are not persuaded. Even if GDP and exam scores correlate 
with one another, they conclude, “it is hard to prove that higher 
cognitive skill levels produce higher GDP.”67 They cite a study 
showing that other factors such as trade policy and the number of R & 
                                                            
65 Id. Do CCK really mean this? If market arguments for diversity are so 
compelling, why the need for affirmative action on the job? If the answer is 
racial discrimination, it would seem that the charge should be explicit. Since it is 
not and since minorities are under-represented in higher level positions, one 
might hypothesize, contrariwise, that for CCK it is nondiscrimination laws that 
stand in the way of minority hiring. For what it is worth, a University of 
California sociology professor thinks so. See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL 
RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE 35–37 (2014). 
66 See Curcio, supra note 4, at 268 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 9–10 (2010)). 
67 Id. at 268–69 (emphasis added). 
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D researchers are no less important to GDP growth. This is not the 
place for a full evaluation of the OECD study. Nor, perhaps, do we 
need one. CCK insist that they hold to the “highest educational 
standards”68 but conclude that “it is a mistake to over-emphasize the 
value of standardized cognitive tests in considering how to improve 
GDP just as it is a mistake to look only at cognitive test results to 
determine who is likely to succeed in school and on the job.”69 
Is this CCK’s real point? If I am right here, CCK are far more 
interested in racial balance than in anything else. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is hard to understand how, believing that tests predict so little, 
academics can be central players in a system where tests of knowledge 
play so large a part. I will not even attempt to do so. I will, however, 
try to answer questions more closely related to CCK’s article: Why do 
McKinsey, Bain Capital and Goldman Sachs ask for SAT scores of job 
applicants?70 How to understand the fierceness with which CCK deny 
both seeking racial balance and “undermining the case for the highest 
intellectual standards,” on the one hand, while, on the other, 
suggesting that minority status is a key predictor of success in the 
marketplace. 
Knowledge and learning ability count. Nowhere in their sixty- 
page article, however, do CCK say anything recognizing that, for 
historical, cultural, or discriminatory reasons, there are real differences 
in academic preparation among racial groups and that tests reflect 
these gaps. For CCK, preparation must be equal across racial lines a 
priori. That being the case, race can be used to determine academic 
and employment opportunity. 
Like so many others, it would appear, CCK are so discomfited by 
racial gaps in testing that they will do anything to avoid recognizing 
their true significance. This must have a profound effect on 
contemporary discourse and understanding. Sweeping away these 
differences, takes eyes off the ball. Downplaying the importance of 
grades, as CCK do in their article, has the same effect. If tests proved 
to be valid, as CCK themselves admit, the solution for minorities 
                                                            
68 Id. at 269. 
69 Id. 
70 Shaila Dewan, How Businesses Use Your SATs, N.Y. Times (March 29, 2014), 
at SR4. Dewan reports that researchers are finding that other tests, such as 
Advanced Placement exams, are even better predictors that the SAT. Id. 
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might be “remedial work to improve performance on the test.”71 That 
is to say, it is the reputed invalidity of tests that allows CCK to ignore 
racial differences—and the needed educational effort. 
Denying real racial differences has a negative effect on non-
minorities as well. Because of its perceived false foundations, because 
of the unimaginability that CCK teach their children and students that 
test scores and grades are unimportant, a climate of general distrust of 
racial discourse is created. This undermines majority support for 
affirmative action and educational enrichment. If there are no real 
knowledge differences between blacks and whites, if they are indeed 
competitive with one another, wherein lie the disadvantages—as in 
“disadvantaged minorities”— that should be at the heart of affirmative 
action? 
Getting minorities into the center of the educational mainstream is 
essential for our country. Holding that everything should turn on race 
subverts this purpose, again, by distracting our attention from what 
needs to be done; holding this position and denying it is worse. An 
open and honest discussion in which merit is not definitionally 
conflated with diversity—a discussion in which the need for legal 
services can be carefully weighed against loosening requirements for 
admission into the legal profession—is called for. Only by allowing 
comparison of the intellectual aspects of the law with those, say, of 
medicine, can we have a chance to figure out what lawyers can and 
should know. Only where we can accept that racial differences in test 
scores are danger signs, not presumptive civil rights violations, will we 
maximize our chance at progress and peace.72 
 
                                                            
71 Id. at 58. 
72 Several hours before I turned this article in, I learned from Professor Lani 
Guinier at a Law and Society meeting that she has finished a new book, THE 
TYRANNY OF MERITOCRACY (forthcoming Jan. 2015). Readers interested in my 
piece will surely want to get her take. 
